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Abstract—We investigate the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF)
of the K-user MIMO multiple access (MAC) and the two user
MIMO interference channel. An unknown number of eavesdrop-
pers are trying to decode the messages sent by the transmitters.
Each eavesdropper is equipped with a number of antennas less
than or equal to a known value NE . The legitimate transmitters
and receivers are assumed to have global channel knowledge.
We present the sum SDoF of the two user MIMO interference
channel. We derive an upperbound on the sum SDoF of the
K-user MAC channel and present an achievable scheme that
partially meets the derived upperbound.
I. INTRODUCTION
The noisy wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner [1],
in which a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to send a
message to a legitimate receiver (Bob), and hide it from
an eavesdropper (Eve). Wyner proved that Alice can send
positive secure rate to Bob using channel coding. He de-
rived capacity-equivocation region for the degraded wiretap
channel. A significant amount of work was carried thereafter
to study the information theoretic physical layer security for
different network models. The relay assisted wiretap channel
was studied in [2]. The secure degrees of freedom (SDoF)
region of multiple access (MAC) channel was presented in
[3]. The SDoF is the the pre-log of the secrecy capacity region
in the high-SNR regime. Using MIMO systems for securing
the message was an intuitive extension due to the spatial
gain provided by multiple antennas. MIMO wiretap channel
secrecy capacity was identified in [4]. Meanwhile, the idea of
cooperative jamming was proposed in [5], where some of the
users transmit independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian noise towards the eavesdropper to improve the sum
secrecy rate of the legitimate parties.
In this paper, we study the K-user MIMO MAC and the two
user MIMO interference channel, each with unknown number
of eavesdroppers. We assume that the legitimate pair has global
channel knowledge. We present the sum SDoF of the two
user MIMO interference channel. We derive an upperbound
on the the sum SDoF of the K-user MAC channel and present
an achievable scheme that partially meets the upperbound
depending on the relations between the nodes’ number of
antennas. We use the following notation, a for vectors, A for
matrices, A† for the hermitian transpose of A, [A]+ for the
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maxA, 0 and Null(A) to define the nullspace of A, whileaCb
is used to define the b-combination of a set a
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider two communication systems, the K-user
MIMO MAC and the two user MIMO interference channel.
The K-user MIMO MAC consists of K transmitters, each
is equipped with M antennas and one legitimate receiver
equipped with N antennas. The two user MIMO interference
channel consists of two transmitters and two receivers, each
is equipped with M antennas. Both systems are studied in
vicinity of an unknown number of passive eavesdroppers. The
jth eavesdropper is equipped with NEj ≤ NE antennas, where
NE is a constant known to all transmitters. Let xi denote the
M × 1 vector of symbols to be transmitted by transmitter i,
where i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}. We can write the received signal at
the jth legitimate receiver at time (sample) k as
Yj(k) =
q∑
i=1
Hi,jVixi(k) + nj(k), (1)
where i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}, j = 1 and q = K for the MAC
channel, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and q = 2 for the interference channel
and the received signal at the jth eavesdropper is
Zj(k) =
q∑
i=1
Gi,j(k)Vixi(k) + nEj(k), (2)
where Hi,j is the matrix containing the channel coefficients
from transmitter i to the legitimate receiver j, Gi,j(k) is the
matrix containing the channel coefficients from transmitter i
to the eavesdropper j, Vi is the precoding unitary matrix
(i.e. ViV†i = I) at transmitter i, nj(k) and nEj(k) are the
additive white Gaussian noise vectors with zero mean and
variance σ2 at the legitimate receiver and the jth eavesdropper,
respectively. We assume that the transmitters have global
channel knowledge. We assume that NE < M . We define
the M × 1 channel input from legitimate transmitter i as
Xi(k) = Vixi(k). (3)
Each transmitter i intends to send a message Wi over n chan-
nel uses (samples) to the legitimate receiver simultaneously
while preventing the eavesdroppers from decoding its message.
The encoding occurs under a constrained power given by
E
{
tr(XiX
†
i )
}
≤ P ∀i = 1, ..., q (4)
Expanding the notations over n channel extensions we get
H
n
i = {Hi(1),Hi(2), . . . ,Hi(n)}. Similarly we can define
G
n
i,j ,X
n
i ,Y
n,Znj . At each transmitter, the message Wi is
uniformly and independently chosen from a set of possible
secret messages for transmitter i, Wi = {1, 2, . . . , 2nRi}.
The rate for Wi is Ri , 1n log |Wi|, where | · | denotes the
cardinality of the set. A secure rate tuple (R1, ..., Rq) is said
to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0 there is an n-length codes
such that the legitimate receiver decode the messages reliably,
i.e.,
Pr{(W1, ..., Wˆq)) 6= (Wˆ1, ..., Wˆq)} ≤ ǫ (5)
and the messages are kept information-theoretically secure
against the eavesdroppers, i.e.,
lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(W1, ...,Wq|Z
n
j ) ≥ lim
n−→∞
1
n
H(W1, ...,Wq)− ǫ
(6)
where H(·) is the Entropy function and (6) implies the secrecy
for any subset S ⊂ {1, 2} of messages including individual
messages [6]. The sum SDoF is defined as
Ds = lim
P→∞
sup
∑
i
Ri
1
2 logP
, (7)
where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate tuples
(R1, ..., Rq), Ds = d1 + ...+ dq , and di is the secure DoF of
transmitter i.
III. K USER MIMO MAC
Theorem 1. The number of SDoF of the K user MAC channel
is upperbound as,
Ds ≤


min(KM −NE , N −
NE
K
) if M < N
M − NE
K
if N ≤M < N + NE
K
N if M ≥ N + NE
K
(8)
Proof:
The first bound for Ds ≤ KM − NE represent the DoF
loss caused by the number of eavesdroppers’ antennas on the
transmitter side. Without loss of generality, we provide an
upperbound for the case of existence of only one eavesdropper
with NE antennas. The SDoF of the single eavesdropper sce-
nario is certainly an upperbound for the multiple eavesdroppers
case, as increasing the number of eavesdroppers can only
reduce the SDoF of the legitimate users. Accordingly, we omit
the eavesdropper subscript for simplicity of notation. Suppose
that we can added |M − N |+ antennas to the receiver side
that won’t decrease the SDoF, the sum rate is upperbounded
by the capacity of an equivalent MIMO wiretap channel with
(M1 + M2) transmit antennas and H = [H1 H2], x =
[x1 x2...xK ]
T and precoding matrix V. The secrecy capacity
(Cs)for the MIMO wiretap channel with one eavesdropper and
fixed known eavesdropper channel was presented in [4], and
is an upperbound for all cases studied in this paper. It is easy
to see that if the eavesdropper channel is unknown and time
varying the SDoF is also upperbounded by the fixed channel
case. The secrecy capacity (Cs) was found to be equal to,
Cs = (X1,Y1)− I(X1,Z) (9)
= max
Kx
log(|(I+H1,1KxH
†
1,1)| − log |(I+GKxG
†)|)(10)
where Kx is the covariance matrix of the transmitted signal.
As H†11H11 and G†G are hermitian, they can be diagonalized
as G†G = UGΛGU
†
G, H
†
11H11 = UH11ΛH11U
†
H11
, where
UGU
†
G = I and UGU
†
G = I. Without loss of generality, Let
V = [VLVN ], where VN contains the NE orthonormal basis
of G, while VL contains the M −NE basis of the orthogonal
complement of VN , and Kx = VΛKxV†. Therefore,
Ds ≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
)
(log |I+UH11ΛH11U
†
H11
VΛKxV
†|
− log |I+UGΛGU
†
GVΛKxV
†|)
)
(a)
≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
(log |ΛH11ΛKx | − log |ΛGΛKx |
)
(b)
≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
(log
KM∏
i=1
λ
i
H11
λ
i
Kx − log
NE∏
i=1
λ
i
Gλ
i
Kx)
)
≤ lim
P→∞
1
logP
(
max
ΛKx
(
KM∑
i=1
log λiH11λ
i
Kx −
NE∑
i=1
log λiGλ
i
Kx)
)
≤ KM −NE (11)
where λiKx is the ith diagonal value of ΛKx and λ
i
G, λ
i
H are
defined similarly. (a) is because log |I+AB| = log |I+BA|
for the above matrices, (b) is because lim
P→∞
log |I+B|
logP =
lim
P→∞
log |B|
logP for any matrix B, and because |AB| = |A||B|
for square matrices, and |VKx |, |VH11 |, |U| are independent
of P .
The second bound M − NE
K
represents the DoF loss of
each transmitter due to the number of eavesdroppers antennas
available. Let die be degrees of freedom of the parts of the
messages sent by transmitter i, which can be decoded by
the eavesdropper. For the receiver to be able to decode the
secure messages with inter-message interference and achieve
the designated SDoF of each transmitter, the receiver must
be able to project the ith secure signal into an interference
free space of dimension di. On the other hand, the non secure
parts of the messages can overlap at the receiver or even does
not reach the receiver because the receiver is not interested
in decoding them and treated as interference. Let αi be the
number of degrees of freedom of the non secure part of the
message i that reaches the receivers while βi be the number of
degrees of freedom of the part that does not reach the receiver.
Accordingly, die = αi + βi and the number of degrees of
freedom of the message i is equal to (di + αi + βi). Since,
the receiver is not interested in decoding the non secure parts
with sizes {αi; i = 1, 2, ...,K}, and the non secure messages
occupy at least max(αj ; j = 1, 2, ...,K) DoF, then
K∑
i=0
di +max(αj ; j = 1, 2, ...,K) ≤ N (12)
while,
βi ≤M −N ∀ i = 1, 2, ...,K (13)
Moreover, since the eavesdropper has NE < M antennas,
i.e the Dof of the transmitted messages is larger than NE then
K∑
i=0
die = NE (14)
The secure DoF is then upperbounded as
Ds ≤ maximize {dj ; j = 1, 2, ..., K}
K∑
i=0
di (15)
subject to,
K∑
i=0
di +max(αj ; j = 1, 2, ..., K) ≤ N(16)
K∑
i=0
(αi + βi) = NE
K∑
i=0
βi ≤ K(M −N)
The sum SDoF is maximized by minimizing max(αi; j =
1, 2, ...,K). Combining the second and third constraint we
have
K∑
i=0
αi ≥ NE −K(M −N) (17)
and minimizing max(αi; j = 1, 2, ...,K) is achieved by
choosing all {αi; j = 1, 2, ...,K} to be equal, and
∑K
i=0 αi =
NE −K(M −N). Accordingly,
max(αj ; j = 1, 2, ...,K) ≤
NE
K
− (M −N) (18)
and,
Ds ≤M −
NE
K
(19)
Similarly, we can prove that for M ≤ N , the SDoF is
upperbounded as,
Ds ≤ N −
NE
K
(20)
The Third bound Ds ≤ N is the due to limited number of
antennas at the receiver which limits the SDoF.
Achievable scheme:
For securing the legitimate messages, the transmitters uses a
two-step noise injection by simultaneously sending a jamming
signal and using a stochastic encoder as follows,
1) The transmitters send a jamming signal with power
P J = αP that guarantees that all eavesdropper have a
constant rate (o(logP )) for all legitimate signal power
values, where α is a constant controlled the transmitters
to adjust the jamming.
2) A stochastic encoder is built using random binning. The
encoder randomness rate is designed to be larger than
of the post-jamming eavesdroppers leakage, hence all
eavesdroppers would have zero rate with the code length
goes to infinity meeting the secrecy constraints in (6).
The jamming signal transmitted is a NE vector r =
[r1 r2... rK ]
T with random symbols using {VJ1 , VJ2 , , VJK}
as jamming precoders1. Hence, the transmitted coded signal
can be broken into legitimate signal, si, and jamming signal,
ri, the precoder, Vi can be also broken into legitimate
1For the special case NE = 1, only one user sends a single jamming
symbol.
precoder, VLi , and jamming precoder, VJi such that
Vixi =
[
V
L
i V
J
i
] [ si
ri
]
,∈ {1, 2, ...,K}.
Choosing VJ to be the unitary matrix, the jamming power
becomes P J = E{tr(rir†i )} = αP , where α is a constant
controlled by the transmitter.
Proposition 1. The jamming signal, r, overwhelms all eaves-
droppers’ signal space, and all eavesdroppers end up decoding
zero DoF of the legitimate messages. The transmitter then uses
a stochastic encoder to satisfy the secrecy constraint in (6)
Let R¯e = I(Z; s1, s2, ..., sK) be the rate of the eavesdropper
with the best channel assuming in worst case scenario that it
also has NE antennas. Let Re = I(Z;W1,W2, ...,WK) be
the legitimate message rate of the same eavesdropper, where
Re < R¯e because of the stochastic encoder used. let R¯ej be
the rate of the jth eavesdropper. Then R¯ej ≤ R¯e∀j ∈ L,
where L is the unknown number of eavesdroppers.
Proof:
nR¯e ≤ I(Z
n; sn1 , s
n
2 , ..., s
n
K)
= h(Zn)− h(Zn|sn1 , s
n
2 , ..., s
n
K)
R¯e = h(Z)− h(Z|s1, s2, ..., sK)
≤ NE logP −NE logP
J + o(logP )
≤ NE logP −NE logαP + o(logP )
≤ o(logP ) = CE (21)
where CE is a constant that does not depend on P and known
to the transmitters.
Remark 1. The constant eavesdropper post-jamming rate
comes from the fact that P J is controlled by the transmitter.
Hence, setting P J = αP , a constant SNR is guaranteed at the
eavesdroppers and a constant rate independent of P . For the
case of the constant known eavesdropper channel or unknown
fading channel with known statistics, the constant C is known
transmitter.
The transmitters use the post-jamming rate difference to
transmit perfectly secure messages using a stochastic en-
coder similar to the one described in [8] according to the
strongest eavesdropper’s rate, C, in worst case scenario to
achieve the secrecy constraint in 6 . The Wyner code Ci ∈
C(Rti, Ri, n)∀i = 1, 2, ...,K of size 2nR
t
i is used to encode a
confidential message set Wi = {1, 2, ..., 2nRi} of transmitter
i, Rti is the transmitted total rate and Ri the secure message
rate (i.e. Rti ≥ Ri), and n is the codeword length. As a
result, the rate Rl = Rti − Ri is the cost of secrecy or
the rate lost to secure the legitimate message. For a Wyner
code, if Rˆe = Rl, then the eavesdropper cannot decode the
secure message sent (i.e limn−→∞ 1nRe ≤ ǫ). The Wyner code
C(Rti, Ri, N) is built using random binning [9]. We gener-
ate 2nR
t
i codewords sni (wi, vi), where wi = 1, 2, ..., 2nRi ,
and vi = 1, 2, ..., 2n(R
t
i−Ri), by choosing the 2nRti symbols
si(wi, vi) independently at random according to the input
distribution p(si). Then we distribute them randomly into
2nRi bins such that each bin contains 2n(Rti−Ri) codewords.
The stochastic encoder of C(Rti, Ri, N) is described by a
matrix of conditional probabilities so that, given wi ∈ Wi,
we randomly and uniformly select a codeword to transmit
from the bin wi or in other words, we select vi from
{1, 2, ..., 2n(R
t
i−Ri)} and transmit sni (wi, vi). We assume that
the legitimate receiver employs a typical-set decoder. Given
the received signal yn, the legitimate receiver tries to find a
pair (wˆ, vˆ) so that sn(wˆ, vˆ) and yn are jointly typical [9]. We
set Ri = I(si,Y1) − I(si,Z) − ǫ and Rti = I(si,Y1) − ǫ.
The error probability and equivocation calculations are straight
forward extensions of similar Wyner random binning encoders
[9],
H(Wi
n) = I(sni ;Y
n)− I(sni ;Z
n)−mǫ (22)
H(Wi
n|Zn) = I(sni ;Y
n|Zn)− I(sni ;Z
n|Zn)− nǫ (23)
= I(sni ;Y
n,Zn)− I(sni ,Z
n)− nǫ (24)
≥ H(Wi
n)− nǫ (25)
and,
H(W1
n
, ...,WK
n|Zn) =
K∑
i
H(Wi
n|Zn) (26)
≥
K∑
i
H(Wi
n)−Knǫ (27)
≥ H(W1
n
, ..., H(WK
n)−Knǫ (28)
. Let U be the post-processing matrix that projects the signal
into a jamming free space at the legitimate receiver. The secure
messages sum rate is then,
K∑
i=1
Ri≥
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I+
K∑
i=1
(UHiV
L
i sis
†
iV
L†
i H
†
iU
†)
∣∣∣∣∣ −Re (29)
As limn−→∞ 1nRe ≤ ǫ for all values ofGi and P , a positive
secrecy rate, which is monotonically increasing with P , is
achieved. Computing the secrecy degrees of freedom boils
down to calculating the degrees of freedom for the first term in
the right hand side of (29), which represents the receiver DoF
after jamming is applied. Next we will calculate the SDoF and
show how jamming is designed to Maximize the achievable
SDoF.
A. Achievability for M ≥ N + NE
K
For this region, the transmitters send the jamming signals
using precoders VJi , using Nullspace jamming , respectively.
All the precoders have NE
K
jamming streams such that the total
number of jamming streams reaching each eavesdropper equal
NE .
Nullspace jamming: In nullspace jamming method, the
transmitter i sends a jamming signal of Ji dimensions using
the precoder VJi which lies in the nullspace of the channel
Hi,
V
J
i = Null(Hi) i ∈ 1, 2, ....,K (30)
This blocks NE dimensions at each eavesdropper and leaves
N free dimensions at the legitimate receiver to attain the
legitimate signal, thus the following sum SDoF is achievable,
Ds ≤ N (31)
B. Achievability for M < N
For this region we use aligned jamming for blocking the
eavesdropper where jamming is aligned at the receiver to
minimize the wasted space and maximize the SDoF
Aligned jamming: The jamming signals of both transmitters
are aligned at the legitimate receiver signal space. Each group
j of transmitters of size Lj ≤ K aligns portions of its jamming
signal together at the receiver. There are KCLj groups of
size L, while the total number of groups
∑a=K
a=2,b≤a iCj,
the number of jamming of streams assigned to each group
(Jg/NE) depends on the relation between (M,N,NE). Let
Ij be the jamming space at the receiver designated for group
j. Each transmitter aligns a part or the whole of its jamming
signal into this jamming space. The total signal space of
transmitter i occupies only M < N dimensions at the receiver.
This make the received signal spaces of different transmitters
distinct at the receiver. So a common space is needed to
direct the jamming signal into. Let Ai span the received
signal space of transmitter i, i.e span the space including all
possible received vectors at the receiver, I is chosen to be the
intersection of these spaces, i.e.,
Ij =
Lj⋂
i=1
Ai. (32)
Ij would have positive size only if M ≥ N . Without loss of
generality, we design (VJi , i = 1, 2, ...,K) such that,
H1,1V
J
1 = H2,1V
J
2 = ... = HLj,1V
J
Lj
= Ij (33)
While the system of equations in ((33)) has more variables
than the number of equations, (32) ensures that the system
has a unique solution as Ij lies in the spans of (Hi,1; i =
1, 2, ...,K .
Let
Hi,1 =
[
H
′
i,1
H
′′
i,1
]
I =
[
I ′j
I ′′j
]
∀ i = 1, 2, ...,K, j = 1, 2, .., Lj
(34)
where H′i,1 contains the M rows of Hi,1 and H′′i,1 contains
the other N −M rows, and I ′i contains the M rows of I and
I ′′i contains the other N −M rows. Therefore, we can choose
the following design which satisfies (33)
V
J
i = (H
′
i,1)
−1I ′j ∀ i = 1, 2, ...,K, j = 1, 2, .., Lj (35)
For the legitimate receiver to remove the jamming signal and
decode the legitimate message, it zero forces the jamming
signal using the post-processing matrix U. For the case NE
is odd, each transmitter will align its jamming signal into
an ⌊NE2 ⌋–dimensional half space using linear alignment. The
remaining 1dimensional space will be equally shared between
the two transmitters’ jamming signal using real interference
alignment [7], yielding each transmitter’s jamming signal to
occupy NE2 .
The jamming alignment is possible for group j the size of
intersection of j is greater than zero or
Lj(M −N) +M ≥ 0 (36)
where the number of jamming streams Jj that can be sent
by each group is constrained to
Jj ≤ Lj(Lj(M −N) +M) (37)
where the Jj streams wastes JjLj dimensions at the receiver
for jamming. For maximizing the achievable SDoF, the group
with the smaller ratio Jj
Lj
is used for jamming first.
The alignment process begins with assigning the maximum
number of jamming streams to the largest possible group as
it can align the largest number of jamming streams per one
dimension wasted at the receiver.
Ds ≤ min(KM −NE, N −
NE
L
), (38)
where L is the result of the following optimization,
maximize L (39)
subject to, M
N −M
≤ L ≤ K (40)
NE ≤ L(L(M −N +M)) (41)
The previous scheme meets the upperbound in 8 at ((L = K
or M
N−M ≤ K) and NE ≤ K(K(M−N)+M)) and at (KM−
NE < N −
N
NE
) achieving Ds = min(KM −NE , N − NNE ) .
C. Achievability for N + NE
K
> M > N
In this region the transmitters uses both the aligned and
Nullspace jamming methods, each transmitter sends M − N
jamming streams using Nullspace jamming and sends NE
K
−
(M −N) jamming streams using aligned jamming.
The achievable SDoF is then
Ds ≤ N −
NE −K(M −N)
L
(42)
Ds ≤ N −
NE −K(M −N)
L
(43)
where L is defined as in (39), and the achievable region
meets the upperbound at (L = K and NE ≤ K((K+1)(M −
N) +M)) and at (K(2M −N)−NE < N − NNE ).
Ds ≤ N −
NE −K(M −N)
K
(44)
≤ M −
NE
K
(45)
IV. THE TWO USER M ×M INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
Theorem 2. The number of SDoF of the two user M ×M
interference channel is upperbound as,
d1 + d2≤M −
NE
2
(46)
Proof: Let d1e and d2e be the maximum degrees of freedom
that the eavesdropper can decode out of the transmitters one
and two signals, respectively. Suppose that we added M −N
antennas to receiver one, this can only improve the coding
scheme rate. As receiver one fully receive the signal sent
by transmitter two to receiver two X2 with modified noise,
and X1 can be decoded by receiver one with no interference
by definition. Then d1 and X2occupies two distinct spaces at
receiver one, the SDoF is upperbounded then as
d1 +max(d
1
e, d2 + d
2
e) ≤M (47)
and for both results of max(d1e, d2+d2e), the following is true
d1 + d2 + d
2
e ≤M (48)
Similarly, by adding M−N antennas to receiver two, we have
d2 + d1 + d
1
e ≤M (49)
Moreover, since the eavesdropper has NE antennas then
d1e + d
2
e = NE (50)
Combining (13), (49), (50)
d1 + d2 ≤M −
NE
2
(51)
Theorem 3. For the two user M ×M interference channel,
the following number of SDoF is achievable
d1 + d2≤M −
NE
2
(52)
Proof:
For this channel, the jamming is aligned using basic inter-
ference alignment method combined with a stochastic encoder
similar to the one used in the MAC,
H21V
J
1 = H22V
J
2 (53)
H11V
J
1 = H12V
J
2 (54)
Using this method NE jamming streams are aligned at NE2
dimensions at each receiver. This leaves N − NE2 dimensions
free of Jamming at each receiver. As both receivers fully
receives both messages and for each receiver to decode its own
message the interfering message should occupy an orthogonal
space, then
d1 + d2 ≤M −
NE
2
(55)
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the K-user MAC channel and the two user
interference channel with multiple antennas at the transmit-
ters, legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Generalizing new
upperbound was established and a new achievable scheme
was provided. We showed that our scheme is optimal for the
interference channel and partially optimal for the MAC.
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